Elections and their aftermath lead today's outlook. Israel faces long coalition talks after the October 27 vote, and Serbia's contest between Vucic and the student movement is likely to bring large new protests in Belgrade. Meanwhile, Ukraine's deep strikes on Russian energy sites look set to continue, and Iranian assassination threats keep the risk to US officials elevated, though it remains low.

I merged the two geopolitician proposals: 0.12 within 180 days, and 0.18 implied within 12 months. NATO has added no new nuclear-sharing host since the Cold War, and Washington turned down Poland's 2022 request to join. Basing warheads requires secure WS3-type vaults, certified aircraft, custody agreements and US approval, none of which appears in the signals. The Skeptic pointed out that France's 'forward deterrence' changes get too little attention, and that France keeping national control would not by itself prevent basing abroad. That is the main upside risk: Macron's 2026 offer of temporary deployments of strategic air forces to partner countries. But temporary aircraft rotations would not meet the bar of confirmed warheads, and governments almost never confirm where warheads are. Six months is too short to build the needed infrastructure. Poland's statement shows what it wants, not what its allies have authorized. I set the probability below both analyst numbers because the resolution requires official confirmation, which is very rare even when weapons are deployed.