The US-Iran war's second month dominates today's outlook: Washington is likely to avoid ground invasion while allies refuse to join offensive strikes, but Iran-aligned forces will almost certainly escalate maritime chokepoint attacks—reshaping global energy security and accelerating Europe's historic defense spending transformation.

The evidence overwhelmingly supports allied non-participation in offensive strikes. Britain has explicitly refused to join the war against Iran (event chain 176, now in de-escalation). France has offered only 'conditional Strait of Hormuz support'—defensive maritime operations, not offensive strikes. Rubio reportedly told G7 diplomats the US is 'not asking for anybody to join the war,' confirming the US itself does not expect allied participation. Trump's simultaneous insults toward allies and threats regarding NATO further erode coalition cohesion rather than build it. The 2003 Iraq War analogy is highly relevant: France, Germany, and Canada refused to join that offensive, and the current operation has even less allied buy-in because it lacks a UNSC mandate. The Skeptic raised a valid concern that the probability is 'a bit high because only one non-US G7 member joining would falsify it in a fluid war.' I acknowledge this asymmetry—the forecast could be broken by a single country's decision—but the structural barriers are significant: domestic political opposition, limited spare strike capacity, legal constraints on offensive operations, and the explicit British refusal. I set 0.82, slightly above the analyst's 0.81, because the accumulation of negative signals (UK refusal, French limitation to Hormuz, Rubio's own statements) makes allied offensive participation extremely unlikely within 30 days. The key tripwire that could change this would be an Iranian attack directly on UK or French military assets, which could invoke self-defense provisions.