A widening US-Iran kinetic exchange in the Gulf and an intensifying Black Sea naval war dominate today's outlook, while Beijing's patient leverage over Moscow — refusing to conclude Power of Siberia-2 — underscores Russia's deepening junior-partner status even as its home front strains under fuel shortages and demographic decline.

Two analysts converge: geopolitician (0.74) and military (0.64). Fixed port chokepoints plus Ukraine's recent naval successes give Moscow strong incentive to impose quick, cheap costs where it still can. HOWEVER, my forecast memory contains an explicit warning: two recent Russia large-strike forecasts resolved INCORRECT at P=0.95 (pattern: base_rate_neglect, overconfidence), because Russian strategic strike campaigns face real resource constraints — and Russia's own refinery/fuel crisis limits munitions tempo. This is the key asymmetry versus the Ukraine campaign forecast. I therefore anchor below the analysts' average, at 0.66, above the dead-zone floor but deliberately restrained. Putin's profile (BVI 5, retaliation calibrated to regime cost tolerance) supports retaliation but not unlimited escalation.