Compound conflict dynamics dominate today's outlook: Israel's systematic infrastructure campaign in Lebanon and the Primorsk terminal strike in Russia create dual supply-chain disruptions, while North Korea exploits US military overextension in Iran to prepare its own provocative window — driving middle powers like the EU and Australia to accelerate new security partnerships.

I assess P=0.68, accepting the Skeptic's downward adjustment from the analyst's 0.725. The physical damage at Primorsk is confirmed — storage tanks hit, operations suspended — and this is not a sentiment-driven disruption but a logistics bottleneck. Primorsk handles roughly 40-50% of normal Baltic crude departures, so even partial shutdown materially impacts the aggregate. The Skeptic correctly flags that Russian exports often reroute quickly after localized strikes, and the fact that Ust-Luga has already resumed loadings is important counterevidence. However, I weigh three factors that sustain the probability: (1) Putin's authorization of combat weapons for private guards at energy sites signals the government expects continued attacks, which itself creates inspection delays and insurance friction beyond immediate physical damage; (2) the 10% threshold for combined Baltic flows is achievable even if Ust-Luga absorbs some overflow, because rerouting takes time and Ust-Luga cannot fully substitute for Primorsk's capacity in the near term; (3) the broader context of Iran war-driven oil market tightness means buyers are already scrambling, compounding any Russian logistics disruption. The Skeptic's suggestion to add base rates from prior port strikes is valid — the Tuapse refinery strikes in 2024 caused approximately 2-3 weeks of measurable throughput reduction. This supports the 21-day window but also suggests state restoration pressure could narrow the impact. Net assessment: more likely than not to hit the 10% threshold, but rerouting capacity prevents high confidence.