Russia's wartime economic strain dominates the outlook: Moscow is highly likely to extend its diesel export ban past September 30 amid a harvest-season fuel crunch, even as brinkmanship at the diesel-powered Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant keeps a low-probability but critical blackout risk alive. Formal mobilization and mass domestic unrest remain unlikely near-term, while a record-low Arctic sea-ice minimum and Russian influence operations against Ukraine's European partners round out the week's forecasts.

This forecast is contingent on a trigger (a new large mobilization wave) that my primary geopolitics analysis rates as unlikely in the near term, and even the 2022 mobilization — a far sharper shock — failed to produce a single sustained 10,000+ gathering because of pre-emptive arrests and Russia's dense repression apparatus. The sociologist set 0.14 and the Skeptic concurred (risk 72). Given my FAILING social record (over by 32pp) and the strong base-rate evidence that mass anti-war mobilization has NOT materialized despite three years of war and one mobilization, I hold at 0.13. The compound conditionality (mobilization occurs AND protests exceed a high numeric threshold AND evade suppression) keeps this firmly low. Pillars: psychohistory, collective action, network theory.