Compound conflict dynamics dominate today's outlook: Israel's systematic infrastructure campaign in Lebanon and the Primorsk terminal strike in Russia create dual supply-chain disruptions, while North Korea exploits US military overextension in Iran to prepare its own provocative window — driving middle powers like the EU and Australia to accelerate new security partnerships.

I assess P=0.80, higher than the analyst consensus of 0.70-0.74, based on three converging lines of evidence. First, the event chain data is overwhelming: 'Israel using Gaza tactics in Lebanon' has 30 clusters over 5 days at near-continuous escalation, and 'Israel bombs petrol station in southern Lebanon' shows 8 clusters with persistent escalation. This operational tempo makes additional infrastructure strikes within 14 days almost inevitable. Second, the Qasmiyeh Bridge strike is confirmed and fits a well-established IDF doctrine — in the 2006 Lebanon War, Israel systematically destroyed over 70 bridges and road segments as part of pre-ground-operation shaping. The current pattern of strikes on multiple fronts (Iran, Lebanon, Gaza simultaneously) reflects a campaign-level approach, not isolated actions. The Skeptic correctly notes the absence of an explicit historical base rate, but the 2006 precedent provides a strong analog: once bridge strikes began in that campaign, they continued daily for weeks. Third, the bar is modest — only two additional distinct logistics nodes over 14 days, when the current tempo suggests multiple strikes daily. The Skeptic's valid concerns about pause scenarios and diplomatic restraint are underweighted by the chain evidence: there are zero de-escalation signals in the Lebanon-specific chains, unlike the broader Iran war chains which show mixed escalation/de-escalation. I factor in a small discount for target-switching to command nodes rather than infrastructure, but the shaping logic strongly favors continued logistics-node targeting.