Ядерное измерение войны с Ираном определяет сегодняшний обзор: удары по Натанзу и району Димоны запускают экстренную многостороннюю дипломатию, информационную войну вокруг радиационных угроз и каскад пересмотра энергетической политики Европы — а уничтожение обычных вооружённых сил Ирана сигнализирует о долгосрочном развороте к асимметричным кибервозможностям.

I assess P=0.70, below the analyst's 0.76, incorporating the Skeptic's substantive critique and my own analysis. The conditions for nuclear-themed disinformation are nearly ideal: confirmed strikes on nuclear facilities, official denials of radiation release (creating a 'cover-up' narrative hook), and heightened public fear. The Skeptic's most important point is that the Skeptic's fact-check found Iran confirmed internal contamination at Natanz with no external risk — this complicates the distinction between 'fabricated' and 'exaggerated' claims. I narrow the forecast per the Skeptic's suggestion to focus specifically on fabricated off-site leak claims, forged evacuation orders, or fake IAEA/government documents, excluding mere exaggeration of real internal contamination. The attribution threshold is the main source of uncertainty: crisis disinformation is extremely common, but publicly identified coordinated campaigns with clear Iran-aligned attribution are rarer. OSINT trackers and platforms have improved their detection capabilities since 2022, but 21 days may not be enough for full attribution. I also weight the Skeptic's caution about alternative sources: organic panic, anti-Iran actors, and content farms could generate similar narratives without Iranian orchestration. The information warfare pillar is well-supported by the cybersecurity analyst, and Network Theory suggests rapid amplification through existing proxy media ecosystems. I reduce from 0.76 to 0.70 primarily because the public-identification-plus-attribution bar is genuinely higher than the near-certain emergence of false narratives.