Война США и Ирана порождает каскад глобальных кризисов: блокада Ормуза удерживает нефть выше $112 с перспективой $120, повреждение более 40 энергообъектов грозит масштабным загрязнением Персидского залива, иранские киберугрозы нацелены на критическую инфраструктуру, а эскалация украинских ударов БПЛА вынуждает Россию вводить чрезвычайные меры под Петербургом.

I assess P=0.68, aligned with the Skeptic's adjusted probability and below the analyst council average of 0.78. The Skeptic's critique is the decisive input here: while Iranian motivation and capability are undeniable, publicly reported and publicly attributed OT disruptions are significantly rarer than IT-side nuisance attacks. I weight this critique heavily. Supporting this forecast: (1) Iran is already conducting kinetic strikes against Gulf states — the barriers to cyber escalation are far lower than during peacetime tensions; (2) Iran has explicitly threatened desalination plants, signaling intent against specific OT targets; (3) The CyberAv3ngers group compromised US water utility PLCs in late 2023 during much lower tensions; (4) The resolution threshold is 'at least one' operator, achievable even with a single successful attack. Moderating factors I incorporate from the Skeptic: (a) Gulf states have invested heavily in cyber hardening since the 2012 Saudi Aramco Shamoon attack; (b) Iran may prefer kinetic attacks or lower-visibility cyber activity that doesn't trigger formal CERT attribution; (c) Attribution lag means an attack could occur but not be publicly confirmed within the 45-day window; (d) Victim underreporting is endemic in Gulf critical infrastructure. I estimate the probability that an attack OCCURS at ~80%, but the probability it becomes publicly reported and attributed within 45 days at ~68%. The 'Iranian hackers threaten cyber-warfare with new strategy' chain at escalation stage (4 clusters, stalled but persistent) provides additional support for active threat posture.