Strait of Hormuz tensions dominate today's outlook as Iran advances sovereignty legislation and intelligence confirms Chinese weapons transfer preparations to Tehran, while the US prepares sanctions responses and oil markets face a contested path to $102. Meanwhile, yesterday's Ukrainian drone strike on Russia's Plesetsk cosmodrome during a satellite launch signals a dramatic expansion of the war's reach into space infrastructure.

SELF-CALIBRATION WARNING: My economics track record is WEAK (Brier=0.318, over by 22pp). I am applying mandatory compression. Additionally, my forecast memory shows a closely analogous Hormuz-related forecast (Japan fuel intervention, Brier=0.90) where I was catastrophically overconfident. I weight the Skeptic's caveats heavily. Quantitative analysis: WTI at $96.57, target $102 = +5.63%. Assuming ~2.5% daily volatility (elevated for current conditions), 18-day standard deviation ≈ 10.6%. A +5.6% move is within 0.53 standard deviations. Under a zero-drift normal model, the one-tailed probability of exceeding this is approximately 30%. Even assuming modest positive drift from persistent tensions, the probability reaches ~35%. The Skeptic correctly flagged that 'tension in Hormuz does not automatically imply an end-month close above a fixed level; price spikes often retrace.' This is the critical insight. The Middle East chain is in 'aftermath' stage — suggesting peak tension (and peak price pressure) may have passed. WTI was down 1.33% today, indicating the current trajectory is downward, not upward. The analyst (economist_bear) and Skeptic both assessed P=0.72, which I believe reflects directional intuition ('oil will stay high') rather than the specific difficulty of closing ABOVE a fixed price on a specific date. Price targets on specific dates are inherently harder than directional forecasts. Three things that could make me wrong: (1) a major Hormuz incident (mine strike, tanker seizure) could spike oil $10+ overnight; (2) Iranian Hormuz sovereignty bill passage could cause panic buying; (3) China-Iran weapons delivery could trigger broader escalation. These tail scenarios justify maintaining P=0.35 rather than going lower. Deviation from analyst/Skeptic (37pp) is justified by: quantitative volatility analysis, my economics overestimation bias (+22pp), forecast memory warning, current declining price trajectory, and aftermath lifecycle stage.