The US-Iran war's second month dominates today's outlook: Washington is likely to avoid ground invasion while allies refuse to join offensive strikes, but Iran-aligned forces will almost certainly escalate maritime chokepoint attacks—reshaping global energy security and accelerating Europe's historic defense spending transformation.

The structural drivers for European defense spending increases are the strongest since the Cold War. Norway's announcement of 3.5% GDP by 2035 (confirmed, event chain 109/113), combined with NATO leaders reportedly endorsing a 5% spending target, creates powerful institutional momentum. Trump's NATO withdrawal threats (event chain 12/16/185, sustained ESCALATION) remove the implicit US security guarantee that historically suppressed European defense investment. The US-Iran war graphically demonstrates that American military resources can be diverted away from European defense. Germany's consideration of delaying its coal phase-out (event chain 204) shows energy-crisis awareness that feeds into security consciousness. The economist's Bayesian framework is sound: prior evidence of rising defense spending post-Ukraine, current political incentives, and the 5% NATO pledge all push the posterior probability upward. However, the Skeptic raised critical counterpoints I weight heavily: (a) historical noncompliance with NATO spending pledges—the 2% target from 2014 took a decade and many members still haven't met it; (b) southern European debt constraints (Italy, Spain, Greece face significant fiscal headwinds); (c) political turnover over 9 years could shift priorities; (d) accounting changes may inflate reported spending without real military capability increases. The gap between current European average (~2-2.5%) and the 3% target requires an additional 0.5-1% GDP shift across diverse economies—a massive fiscal commitment. I set 0.70, below the Skeptic's 0.77, because while the direction is clearly correct, the magnitude of fiscal adjustment required and the 9-year horizon introduce substantial implementation risk. The psychohistory pillar suggests security crises create spending impulses that decay as threats recede or shift—if the Ukraine war ends or US-Iran de-escalates, the urgency may diminish before targets are met.