A major French government identity breach triggers regulatory action and criminal monetization risk across Europe, while Zelenskyy's surprise Ukraine-India security agreement and Trump's psychedelics executive order mark two confirmed policy pivots; meanwhile Russian pressure in Sumy falls short of encirclement thresholds and PLA carrier coercion near Taiwan continues on routine cadence.

I have inverted the sociologist's framing (P=0.24 that protests DO occur → P=0.76 that they don't). Base rate under wartime Russia: zero protests above 50,000 since February 2022 despite multiple shock events (mobilization September 2022, Prigozhin mutiny June 2023, Navalny death February 2024). Repression capacity has increased, not decreased, since 2022 — new laws on 'discrediting the military,' expanded Rosgvardiya deployment, biometric surveillance, preemptive detention of organizers. The Levada tension signal is real but grievance depth alone is insufficient without political entrepreneurs, protected public space, and defection tolerance — all absent. Sociologist weight 0.52 (strongest agent in social sector), so I take the 0.24 as a reasonable upper bound on protest probability and invert. Self-calibration: social sector +17pp overestimation bias; framed as 'no protests,' my bias would tend to underestimate this null probability, so I lift to 0.82. Russia-Ukraine war chain in DEVELOPMENT stage with dominant interpretation emphasizing 'expanded censorship' (80%) and 'deepened domestic repression' (85%) — strong supporting context.