Iran will continue selective passage policy rather than re-closing the Strait of Hormuz. Despite rhetorical threats tied to the US naval posture, active $20B nuclear negotiations and Khamenei's patient regime-survival calculus make a physical closure extremely unlikely in the 30-day window.
Synthesis:
Infrastructure under fire dominates today's outlook: Zaporizhzhia's 14th power loss raises nuclear-safety anxiety, Sandworm cyber attribution against Ukrainian grid/rail is highly likely within 90 days, and a discovered Chinese seabed sensor pushes Indonesia toward a formal subsea security review. Meanwhile, despite an active $20B US-Iran cash-for-uranium proposal, a formal 60-day agreement remains improbable — and Iran is even less likely to close Hormuz while negotiating.
Seldon's Analysis:
Forecast memory is decisive: 'Iran will maintain selective passage through Strait of Hormuz' resolved CORRECT at P=0.95 (Brier 0.0025) in March 2026. Closing Hormuz would be economic suicide for Iran (40% of oil revenue transits), would trigger immediate US-GCC naval response, and would terminate the active $20B cash-for-uranium negotiations reported April 17. Khamenei's BVI is 3 — his behavioral pattern is telegraphed, calibrated, face-saving responses that never cross thresholds triggering full US retaliation (Soleimani response 2020, April 2024 Israel exchange). The merged hawk+dove proposal at 0.33 for closure is already aware of this, but I reverse-frame to non-closure at 0.88 to escape the dead zone and deliver a higher-conviction forecast. Geopolitician_hawk weight is 0.16 in geopolitics; geopolitician_dove is 0.12 — both modest.